The Indo-Pak peace process was started a few years back with great fanfare and it had been moving on multiple tracks for quite sometime now. A number of confidence building measures were implemented to create an atmosphere of trust. It had been universally accepted that the greatest problem between the two countries was trust deficit. There were divergent views about Kashmir. Pakistan claimed it to be the core issue while as Delhi treated it as a non-issue. In any case, Kashmir seemed to be the symptom and not the disease. The disease was much deeper. In fact it was going back right to partition itself and if analysed further, it may even go beyond that. It is the basic conflict between two communities which was reinforced and solidified by the partition of the sub-continent. The first requirement is to remove this mistrust and reconcile the two opposing ideologies. Unless the two countries sincerely and genuinely reconcile to each others’ existence, nothing can move forward. It is precisely for achieving this goal that the confidence building measures had been initiated. Some of these measures as applied to direct relationship between two countries in regard to trade, cultural exchanges, tourism etc have shown appreciable movement forward, even though these have remained mostly confined to the elite on both sides. These are in general yet to percolate down to the grass roots level among the common masses. In regard to Kashmir, the confidence building measures have remained confined to symbolic gestures. There has not been any substantive growth in the implementation of these which has diluted their impact. The peace process has been going on simultaneously on different tracks. The first track is the direct exchange between two countries at various official levels from the heads of governments downwards. This interaction has been going on periodically with some progress on certain issues and some stalemate on others. However, the main problem with this track has been its dependence on the internal conditions on two sides. With each turn and twist in the internal political conditions, the “Track One” gets stalled. We have to wait for conditions to stabilise before any further movement can start on this track. At the present moment Pakistanis are totally engrossed in the presidential election. Neither the Government nor the people have any time to ponder about the fate of Kashmiris. In fact, due to internal political compulsions the progress achieved so far has a chance of getting derailed. It has been observed that in the past, the politicians have a tendency to bring out emotive aspects of the problem to take out some political mileage. Keeping in view the dimensions of the problems faced by them locally, this time they may remain glued to their own internal situation. However, there is another situation looming large on the horizon. It is the Indian Parliament elections which may be held before time due to the conflict generated by the nuclear deal. Thus after Pakistan situation gets stabilised, we may have Indian internal engagement for the entire next year. This will put Kashmir on the back burner for a year or so notwithstanding the lofty declarations from both sides that the peace process is irreversible and so on. Kashmir is not a compulsive problem for both the countries. It does not affect their health in the short term. The effect is felt in the long term by their economies as the continuance of the “nuclear flash point” image discourages long term massive foreign investments here compared to China and some other South Asian countries. In addition, the diversion of resources towards defence establishments on two sides makes the common people poorer with each passing day. The worst sufferers of this dithering facing the brunt directly are the Kashmiris whose condition is worsening day by day. For all practical purposes, the “Track One” is blocked for the present!

Next to the “Track One” is the “Track Two” which involves back channel diplomacy. This track continues to remain active as it mostly involves people not themselves connected directly with the governing processes on two sides. However, the proximity as well as access of its players on two sides to the present rulers may also put them in a temporary freeze. There are some other disadvantages with the “Track Two”. It is mostly confined to the elite on two sides. It has most of the time remained confined to upper echelons of the society. Agreements and understandings reached at the elitist level may not always go down well with the grass roots common masses. Such efforts have a tendency to fail unless these have mass participation. One good suggestion for “Track Two” could be to bring it down to the grass roots level. If there is an appreciable exchange at various levels in different sections of the society on both sides, it will not only take out the emotional heat of the conflict but will generate tremendous good will and bonhomie which is essential for the success of “Track Two”. The stalling of the direct top level interaction between two countries is bound to have a similar stalling effect on the back channel diplomacy. One can presume that even this track is getting blocked temporarily if not permanently. However, if the two sides are really sincere in solving the problems plaguing this sub-continent, they can encourage continuance as well as widening of “Track Two” to all levels of the society. There should be no difficulty on this count as it does not involve any commitments from the government side. On the contrary more exchanges at various levels mean increased people to people understanding. Finally, we come to “Track Three” or what can be termed as “Intra Regional Track” in both the problematic regions. This can go on endlessly without any restrictions or constraints. The main drawback is the track losing itself by becoming divorced from the actual ground reality. This type of interaction can succeed if it addresses in the first instance the basic problems being faced by common masses in the region which will give it the requisite credibility and the legitimacy to go on. In the instant case the interaction has been going on for quite sometime but in spite of repetitions about the necessity of addressing the issues directly affecting the people in their daily lives especially pertaining to human rights, no substantial and tangible progress is visible on the ground. The deliberations as a consequence of inability to address the basic issues seem hollow. Another drawback is the limitation of interaction to above ground civil society leaving the major chunk of the disaffected untouched. This track to be successful has to be widened to cover all sections of the society regardless of their views, ideology, convictions, or stances. This interaction is expected to give inputs to other two tracks including the main one. This can only be done when it is an all inclusive deliberation generating comprehensive inputs. Thus even this track seems to be getting stalled at present by limiting itself to larger and long term issues leaving the stark ground reality untouched. A tragic reality of the present situation is that the Indian Civil Society does not come out openly in the media about the happenings in Kashmir. There seems to be one common “National Interest” for both the print as well as electronic media which is to toe the official line. If only the stalwarts of the civil society and the veterans of the media could come out openly to present the real and absolute truth of the situation actually obtaining in Kashmir, it would make a lot of difference. These inputs give an impression of all the tracks of peace process getting blocked or stalled at present. The only reality is the security forces getting an absolutely free hand to settle all scores with Kashmiris. The result is increasing alienation and a simmering discontent itching to burst out with explosive force at the slightest provocation. Should this happen, all the tracks would get blown out and we will be back to square one!